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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellee has designated and ordered the issues differently from that which is 
set forth by the Appellants, given that some issues are logically antecedent to other issues 
and by necessity should be addressed first. The Appellee's re-ordering is also 
chronological, in an attempt to clarify the procedural time line for the Court. 
Issue No. 1: 
Part A: Did Anderton and Prime Time fail to preserve objections to the trial 
court's finding that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien? And if so, does that 
failure prevent them from arguing their objections on appeal where they have failed to 
allege plain error or exceptional circumstances in their opening brief? 
Standard of Review: In deciding this issue, the Court is not reviewing a decision 
of the trial court, and therefore, there is no standard of review. 
Part B: If the issue set forth in Part A above was preserved for appeal, did the trial 
court correctly find that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien based on its finding 
that there was a stipulation between the parties? And if not, was such error harmless? 
Standard of Review: The existence of a stipulation is a question of fact, and 
questions of fact are reviewed for clear error. State v. Davis. 2007 UT App 13, f 8,155 
1 
P.3d 909. A trial court's findings of fact should only be set aside if they are "against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State ex rel. Z.D.. 2006 UT 54, f 32, 147 
P.3d401. 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court correctly find that, because there was no collusion 
between Sage and the subsequent purchasers of the Property, the subsequent purchasers 
were "bona fide purchasers"? And if not, was such error harmless? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of fact, which is reviewed for 
clear error. State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, f 8, 155 P.3d 909. A trial court's findings 
of fact should only be set aside if they are "against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." State ex rel. Z.D.. 2006 UT 54,132, 147 P.3d 401. 
Issue No, 3: 
Part A: Did Anderton and Prime Time fail to preserve objections to the trial 
court's finding that the First Lis Pendens was a wrongful lien? And if so, does that 
failure prevent them from arguing their objections on appeal where they have failed to 
allege plain error or exceptional circumstances in their opening brief? 
Standard of Review: In deciding this issue, the Court is not reviewing a decision 
of the trial court, and therefore, there is no standard of review. 
Part B: If the issue set forth in Part A above was preserved for appeal, did the trial 
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court correctly hold that the Lis Pendens recorded on July 14, 2006 ("the First Lis 
Pendens"), which did not correspond to any properly filed complaint, constituted a 
wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-102 (2005)? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Tooele County. 2002 UT 8, f 8, 44 P.3d 680. 
Issue No, 4: Did the trial court correctly hold that the Lis Pendens recorded on August 
13, 2006 ("the Second Lis Pendens") constituted a wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 
38-9a-102 (2005)?1 
Standard of Review: This issue, which Appellants concede was not preserved for 
appeal, is reviewed for plain error and/or exceptional circumstances, given that the 
Appellants have raised those justifications for review. State v. Winfield. 2006 UT 4, | 
14, 128 P.3d 1171. 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court correctly hold that Us pendens may be removed pursuant 
to the Wrongful Lien Injunction Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9a-101 to -205 (2005)? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, If 8,44 P.3d 680. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 to -7 (2005). 
^ though Anderton and Prime Time framed as one issue whether both the First 
and Second Lis Pendens were correctly found to be wrongful liens (see Appellant Brief, 
at 1, Issue No. 1), Sage has framed the issues separately, given their factual distinctions. 
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2. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-101 to -205 (2005). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5 (Supp. 2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
h THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The Appellee in this case is Doug Jessop Construction, Inc. dba Sage Builders 
("Sage"). The Appellants in this case, Joseph Anderton ("Anderton") and Prime Time 
Marketing Services, Inc. ("Prime Time") are appealing a wrongful lien injunction, and 
orders and a judgment related to the injunction, entered against them by the Honorable 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki, Third District Judicial Court, Salt Lake County. 
In October of 2005, Sage and Prime Time (through Anderton) entered into a Real 
Estate Purchase Contract ("the REPC"), under which Prime Time agreed to purchase 
from Sage a residence that Sage was building in Salt Lake County ("the Property"). After 
construction on the Property was substantially complete, Prime Time refused to complete 
the purchase, claiming that a deadline had been missed by Sage. Sage disputed Prime 
Time's claims and refused to return the earnest money. Based on Prime Time's refusal to 
purchase the home, Sage located other buyers and attempted to close on the sale of the 
Property. In the process, Sage discovered that Anderton, on behalf of Prime Time, had 
recorded a notice of interest ("the Notice of Interest") on the Property on May 11, 2005, 
which prevented the sale to the subsequent purchasers. [R. at 16.] 
This case arises from Sage's efforts to have the Notice of Interest, as well as two 
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subsequent lis pendens recorded by Anderton and Prime Time, removed from the 
Property. 
II. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT 
BELOW. 
On June 28,2006, after discovering the Notice of Interest, Sage filed a Petition for 
Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction and Request for Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction 
as provided for under Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9a-201 to 202 (2005). [R. at 1-45.] 
On July 14,2006, while Sage's petition was pending, Anderton, on behalf of 
Prime Time, recorded a lis pendens ("the First Lis Pendens") against the Property. 
On July 17,2006, the trial court entered an Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien 
Injunction nullifying the Notice of Interest and the First Lis Pendens, and enjoining 
Anderton and Prime Time from "making, uttering, recording, or filing any further liens 
without specific permission of the court." [R. at 79-80.] Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
38-9a-203, Anderton and Prime Time requested a hearing. Subsequently, they filed an 
Answer to Petition and Verified Counterclaim [R. at 87-95] and a Motion for Leave to 
File Lis Pendens and Dissolve the Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction or, in the 
Alternative, for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [R. at 96-108]. 
On August 4,2006, the trial court granted the Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order, preventing Sage from selling or otherwise transferring the Property. [R. at 
122-25.] 
On Friday, August 11,2006, the trial court held a hearing at which it (1) left in 
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place the Wrongful Lien Injunction, causing Anderton and Prime Time to be permanently 
enjoined from "making, uttering, recording, or filing any further liens" against the 
Property "without specific permission of the court"; and (2) dissolved the temporary 
restraining order. [R. at 166.] The trial court also found that the counterclaim was not 
properly filed, given the limited nature of the wrongful lien proceeding. [R. at 969, pg. 
57.] Counsel for Sage was directed to prepare an order. [R. at 166.] 
After the hearing on August 11,2006, Prime Time filed a complaint against Sage 
in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Civil No. 060913306, seeking specific 
performance under the REPC. 
On Monday, August 14, 2006, Sage submitted an order to the trial court, which 
was signed that day. [R. at 167-69.] On that same day, Anderton, on behalf of Prime 
Time, recorded a second lis pendens ("the Second Lis Pendens") against the Property. [R. 
at 205.] Counsel for Anderton and Prime Time (R. Willis Orton and Ryan B. Frazier of 
Kirton & McConkie) immediately filed a motion to withdraw as counsel [R. at 170-82] 
based on Anderton5 s actions, and they sought an expedited hearing on their motion [R. at 
211-13]. 
The next da}', August 15,2006, after being notified of the Second Lis Pendens by 
counsel for Anderton and Prime Time, Sage filed a Motion to Remove Lis Pendens Filed 
in Violation of Wrongful Lien Injunction & for an Expedited Hearing. [R. at 183-210.] 
Both the Motion to Withdraw and the Motion to Remove Lis Pendens were heard 
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and granted by the trial court the following day, on August 16,2006. [R. at 214-20.] 
The trial court at that time also set a hearing for Friday, August 18, 2006, and instructed 
Mr. Orton and Mr. Frazier to give Anderton and Prime Time notice to appear at that 
hearing. [R. at 970, pg. 14.] Mr. Orton and Mr. Frazier provided Anderton and Prime 
Time with that notice. [R. at 221-23.] 
Mr. Anderton appeared at the hearing held on Friday, August 18, 2006 and was 
informed of the events that took place at the hearing on August 16,2006 and given a 
chance to respond. [R. at 970, pgs. 23-24.] 
The trial court entered its Findings and Order and its Order and Judgment on 
September 25, 2006, awarding Sage $16,091.17 in costs and attorneys' fees against 
Anderton and Prime Time. [R. at 364—75.] 
Anderton and Prime Time filed a notice of appeal on October 23, 2006. [R. at 
488-90.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In October of 2005, Sage and Prime Time entered into a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract ("the REPC"), under which Prime Time agreed to purchase from Sage 
a residence that Sage was building in Salt Lake County ("the Property5'). At all times 
relevant to this appeal, Anderton was Prime Time's sole owner, agent, and acting 
president. 
2. After construction on the Property was substantially complete, Prime Time 
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refused to complete the purchase, claiming that a deadline had been missed by Sage. 
Sage disputed Prime Time's claims and refused to return the earnest money. Based on 
Prime Time's refusal to purchase the home, Sage located other buyers and attempted to 
close on the sale of the Property. 
3. In the process of closing on the sale of the Property, Sage discovered that 
Anderton, on behalf of Prime Time, had recorded a notice of interest ("the Notice of 
Interest") on the Property on May 11, 2005, which prevented the sale to the subsequent 
purchasers. [R. at 16.] 
4. On June 28, 2006, after discovering the Notice of Interest, Sage filed a 
Petition for Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction and Request for Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien 
Injunction as provided for under Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9a-201 to 202 (2005). [R. at 
1-45.] 
5. On July 14, 2006, while Sage's petition was pending, Anderton, on behalf 
of Prime Time, recorded a lis pendens ("the First Lis Pendens") against the Property. 
6. On July 17, 2006, the trial court entered an Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien 
Injunction ("the Wrongful Lien Injunction") nullifying the Notice of Interest and the First 
Lis Pendens, and enjoining Anderton and Prime Time from "making, uttering, recording, 
or filing any further liens without specific permission of the court." The Wrongful Lien 
Injunction also contained the following language in bold, 15-point font: "This injunction 
will be presumed valid unless and until superseded by a subsequent order." [R. at 79-80.] 
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7. The Wrongful Lien Injunction was served on Anderton on behalf of himself 
and Prime Time on July 31, 2006. [R. at 83.] Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-203, 
Anderton and Prime Time requested a hearing. [R. at 83.] 
8. Subsequently, through counsel, Anderton and Prime Time filed an Answer 
to Petition and Verified Counterclaim [R. at 87-95] and a Motion for Leave to File Lis 
Pendens and Dissolve the Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction or, in the Alternative, 
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [R. at 96-108]. 
9. On August 4,2006, the trial court granted the Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order, preventing Sage from selling or otherwise transferring the Property. 
[R. at 122-25.] 
10. The trial court held a hearing on Friday, August 11,2006, at which it 
addressed both the motion for preliminary injunction filed by Anderton and Prime Time 
and their objection to the Wrongful Lien Injunction. [R. at 969.] 
11. Anderton was present at the August 11, 2006 hearing. [R. at 664.] 
12. At the hearing, counsel for Anderton and Prime Time agreed with the trial 
court's statement that there was a concession between the parties that the Notice of 
Interest "was not a correct lien." [R. at 969, pgs. 4-5.] Their counsel also stated that his 
clients had previously voluntarily removed the Notice of Interest from the Property. [R. 
at 969, pg. 5.] 
13. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court (1) left in place the 
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Wrongful Lien Injunction, causing Anderton and Prime Time to be permanently enjoined 
from "making, uttering, recording, or filing any further liens" against the Property 
"without specific permission of the court"; and (2) dissolved the temporary restraining 
order. [R. at 166.] The trial court also found that the counterclaim was not properly filed, 
given the limited nature of the wrongful lien proceeding. [R. at 969, pg. 57.] Counsel 
for Sage was directed to prepare an order. [R. at 166.] 
14. After the hearing on August 11,2006, Prime Time filed a complaint against 
Sage in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Civil No. 060913306, seeking 
specific performance under the REPC. The complaint was not served on Sage or any 
agents of Sage, and acceptance of service was not requested from Sage's counsel. [R. at 
208.] 
15. On Monday, August 14, 2006, Sage submitted an order to the trial court, 
which was signed that day. [R. at 167-69.] 
16. On that same day, Anderton, on behalf of Prime Time, recorded a second lis 
pendens ("the Second Lis Pendens") against the Property. [R. at 205.] 
17. The Second Lis Pendens was recorded before documents necessary to 
complete the closing of the sale of the home to the new purchasers could be completed 
and recorded, and therefore, the Second Lis Pendens prevented Sage from closing on the 
sale of the Property. [R. at 208-209.] 
18. Counsel for Anderton and Prime Time (R. Willis Orton and Ryan B. Frazier 
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of Kirton & McConkie) immediately filed a motion to withdraw as counsel [R. at 170-82] 
based on Anderton's actions in recording the Second Lis Pendens, and they sought an 
expedited hearing on their motion [R. at 211-13]. 
19. In support of the motion to withdraw, counsel submitted the Affidavit of R. 
Willis Orton, which stated in part: 
Following the August 11,2006, hearing on petitioner's Petition for 
Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction and the Respondents' Motion for 
Leave to File Lis Pendens and Dissolve the Ex-Parte Civil Wrongful 
Lien Injunction or, in the alternative, for Temporary Restraining 
Order and Preliminary Injunction in which my clients' positions 
were overruled, my clients, through Mr. Anderton, and I met and 
determined a course of future strategy in this and a related case. 
However, on Monday, August 14, 2006, at approximately Noon, I 
became aware that my clients may have recorded a lis pendens 
against the real property which is the subject of this action, which 
action was directly contrary to our strategy and my advice to the 
Respondents, which action was undertaken without my knowledge 
and approval. 
[R. at 180.] 
20* The next day, August 15,2006, after being notified of the Second Lis 
Pendens by counsel for Anderton and Prime Time, Sage filed a Motion to Remove Lis 
Pendens Filed in Violation of Wrongfiil Lien Injunction & for an Expedited Hearing. [R. 
at 183-210.] 
21. An expedited hearing was set for the following day, August 16,2006, and 
Anderton was given notice of that hearing, but failed to attend. [R. 211-13; 970, pg. 12.] 
22. Both the Motion to Withdraw and the Motion to Remove Lis Pendens were 
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heard and granted by the trial court the following day, on August 16, 2006. [R. at 
214-20.] The trial court at that time also set a hearing for Friday, August 18, 2006, and 
instructed Mr. Orton and Mr. Frazier to give Anderton and Prime Time notice to appear at 
that hearing. [R. at 970, pg. 14.] 
23. Mr. Orton and Mr. Frazier provided Anderton and Prime Time with that 
notice. [R. at 221-23.] 
24. The August 18, 2006 hearing was held "as an accommodation and 
convenience for Mr. Anderton, to advise Mr. Anderton of what had occurred" at the 
previous hearing. [R. at 970, pg. 23.] Mr. Anderton appeared at the hearing and was 
informed of the events that took place at the hearing on August 16,2006 and given a 
chance to respond. [R. at 970, pgs. 23-24.] The trial court specifically waived the 20-day 
waiting period set forth in Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. at 970, pg. 
27.] 
25. The trial court entered its Findings and Order and its Order and Judgment 
on September 25, 2006, awarding Sage $16,091.17 in costs and attorneys' fees against 
Anderton and Prime Time. [R. at 364-75.] 
26. Anderton and Prime Time filed a notice of appeal on October 23,2006. [R. 
at 488-90.] 
27. On December 18,2006, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted 
Sage's motion to heive Anderton held in civil contempt of court. The trial court 
12 
specifically found that Anderton acted in contempt of the Wrongful Lien Injunction 
"when he knowingly and intentionally recorded a lis pendens on August 14,2006, in 
direct violation of that order/' [R. at 804-808.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The issue of whether the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien was not 
preserved below, and therefore this Court should not review it on appeal. Even if the 
issue were preserved for appeal, the trial court's finding of a stipulation between the 
parties that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien was not clearly erroneous. In 
addition, if there was any error, it was harmless and is therefore not grounds for reversal. 
2. Anderton and Prime Time, not Sage, had the burden of showing that the 
subsequent purchasers were not bona fide purchasers in support of their motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The trial court correctly found that they did not meet that burden, 
and its use of the term "bona fide purchasers" was really a finding that there was no 
collusion between Sage and the subsequent purchasers. Even if the trial court erred in its 
use of the term "bona fide purchasers," such an error was harmless and is therefore not 
grounds for reversal. 
3. The issue of whether the First Lis Pendens was a wrongful lien was not 
preserved below, and therefore this Court should not review it on appeal. Even if the 
issue were preserved for appeal, the First Lis Pendens was properly removed as a 
wrongful lien because it was not filed in connection with any pending action affecting 
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title to or possession of real property. 
4. Justification does not exist for appellate review of whether the Second Lis 
Pendens was a wrongful lien. First, Anderton and Prime Time's allegations of "plain 
error" are not directed against the issue from which they appeal. Second, Anderton and 
Prime Time have not established the elements necessary to show plain error. And third, 
there are no exceptional circumstances that would allow appellate review of this issue. 
Even if there were justification for appellate review, the trial court correctly found that 
the Second Lis Pendens was a wrongful lien because it was a lien that was filed in 
violation of a Wrongful Lien Injunction. 
5. The trial court correctly held that a lis pendens could be removed on the 
Wrongful Lien Injunction Act based on the plain language of the statute and the clear 
intent of the legislature. The existence of more than one statutory remedy for removing 
lis pendens is beneficial for victims of wrongful lis pendens, and there is no reason to 
limit possible relief to a single statutory provision. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE NOTICE OF 
INTEREST WAS A WRONGFUL LIEN. 
The trial court found that the Notice of Interest recorded by Anderton on behalf of 
Prime Time was a wrongful lien based on concessions made by their counsel at the 
hearing, the fact that Anderton and Prime Time voluntarily removed the Notice of Interest 
prior to the hearing, and the pleadings filed by their counsel. [R. at 969, pgs. 4-6, 55.] 
On appeal, Anderton and Prime Time are now attempting to argue that Notice of 
Interest was not a wrongful lien. However, Anderton and Prime Time have failed to 
preserve the issue for appeal. Even if they did preserve the issue, this Court should find 
that the trial court's finding of a stipulation was not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, even 
if this Court does find error, it should nevertheless find that any error was harmless error 
that does not warrant reversal. 
A. Anderton and Prime Time Did Not Preserve This Issue Below and May 
Not Argue It Now on Appeal. 
Utah case law has developed certain requirements for preserving an issue for 
appeal. Specifically, 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 
issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error 
and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. For a 
trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error (1) the issue 
must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically raised, 
and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority. 
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438 Main Street v. Easy Heat. Inc.. 2004 UT 72,151, 99 P.3d 801 (quotations and 
citations removed). Issues not raised in this manner at trial are usually deemed waived. 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
Although Anderton and Prime Time claim to have preserved the issue of whether 
the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien, a review of the record at the pages they 
indicate in their brief [R. at 102-103] discloses no argument on point. On the contrary, 
those pages contain argument related to whether the First Lis Pendens was a wrongful 
lien. Moreover, despite being given the opportunity to do so, counsel for Anderton and 
Prime Time raised no argument or objection with respect to the Notice of Interest being 
considered a wrongful hen at the August 11, 2006 hearing. [R. at 969, pgs. 3-6.] 
Because Anderton and Prime Time have not preserved the issue for appeal, this court 
need not review it. 
B. The Trial Court's Finding of a Stipulation Between the Parties That 
the Notice of Interest Was a Wrongful Lien Was Not Clearly 
Erroneous. 
Even if this Court finds that the issue of whether the Notice of Interest was a 
wrongful lien was preserved for appeal, it should nevertheless find that the trial court's 
finding of a stipulation between the parties that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien 
was not clearly erroneous. In addition, if there was any error, it was harmless and is 
therefore not grounds for reversal. 
As a preliminary matter, Sage notes that Anderton and Prime Time have failed to 
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marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial court's determination that there was a 
stipulation. When a party fails to challenge and marshal all of the evidence underlying a 
trial court's factual findings, an appellate court assumes that the lower court's judgment 
was correct. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson. 942 P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997). 
In their brief, Anderton and Prime Time cite only one fact supporting the trial 
court's finding that the parties had stipulated that the Notice of Interest was wrongful, but 
neglect to mention two other facts that also support the trial court's conclusion. (See 
Appellant Brief, at 46-47.) First, their counsel made a representation to the trial court at 
the August 11, 2006 hearing that they had voluntarily removed the Notice of Interest from 
the Property prior to the hearing. [R. at 969, pg. 5.] This evidence was expressly 
mentioned by the court in support of its determination as an indication of a concession. 
[R. at 969, pgs. 5-6, 55.] Second, the pleadings filed by Anderton and Prime Time made 
no argument in opposition to the Notice of Interest being a wrongful lien, and in fact, 
requested permission to record a lis pendens on the Property instead of the Notice of 
Interest. The trial court also mentioned this fact at the hearing in support of its conclusion 
that there was a stipulation or concession that the Notice of Interest was wrongful. [R. at 
969, pg. 4.] The failure of Anderton and Prime Time to marshal all of the relevant facts, 
including these two critical facts, allows this Court to affirm the decision of the trial court 
without further review. 
However, even if Anderton and Prime Time had correctly marshaled all of the 
17 
evidence, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's determination that there 
was a stipulation. The trial court's finding, made on the record, was as follows: 
THE COURT: ...[T]he first matter that I have before the Court is whether 
or not the notice of interest that was filed in this matter is or is not a 
wrongful lien. This is the first issue I have to address and this is how I wish 
to address it. 
It appears to me that, reading the opposition filed by Mr. Orton, there 
seems to be some concession that maybe the notice of lien was not a - was 
not a correct lien - and, of course, you can correct me if I'm wrong, and I'm 
sure you will Mr. Orton - but it was not a correct lien. And the reason why 
I say that is then he requested permission pursuant to my temporary -
pursuant to the order to file a lis pendens in this matter, something that 
would more approximately relate to a direct lien on the property. 
If I'm correct in my assumptions, then it appears that the motion to 
remove the wrongful lien is well taken, and the notice of interest should be 
removed. 
Mr. Orton, have I overstated your position? 
MR. ORTON: No. However, I need to point out we're dealing with two 
issues here. 
THE COURT: Oh, I understand. 
MR. ORTON: You understand that. But I also should point out to the 
Court that notice of interest has since been removed from the property. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, the notice of interest, since being removed, 
it appears that you have prevailed on your notice of interest claim - on the 
removal of your inappropriate lien. Is that correct, Mr. Morris? 
MR. MORRIS: That's correct. 
[R. at 969, pgs. 4-5.] Given the pleadings and representations before the trial court, 
including specifically the fact that (i) counsel for Anderton and Prime Time agreed on the 
record that the Notice of Interest should be removed; (ii) Anderton and Prime Time 
voluntarily removed the Notice of Interest prior to the hearing; and (iii) the pleadings 
filed by Anderton and Prime Time did not oppose removal of the Notice of Interest, and 
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instead, affirmatively sought permission to file a lis pendens instead, it was not clearly 
erroneous for the trial court to find that there was a stipulation that the Notice of Interest 
was a wrongful lien. 
C. Any Error Was Harmless Error. 
Even if the trial court did commit error in making its finding, such error was 
harmless and therefore, it is not grounds for reversal. "On appeal, the appellant has the 
burden of demonstrating an error was prejudicial—that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Covey v. Covey. 2003 UT App 
380,%21, 80 P.3d 553 (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp.. 820 P,2d 482, 489 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991)). Where an error is harmless, an appellate court does not reverse 
the judgment of the trial court. Hall v. NACM Intermountain. Inc.. 1999 UT 97, U 21, 
988 P.2d 942. 
Any finding by the trial court in this case that the Notice of Interest constituted a 
wrongful lien was not prejudicial to Anderton and Prime Time for two reasons. First, 
Anderton and Prime Time had already voluntarily removed the Notice of Interest by the 
time the trial court ruled on the issue. [R. at 969, pgs. 4-5.] Thus, removal of the Notice 
of Interest from the Property was not the result of the trial court's ruling. Second, the trial 
court's finding that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful hen was not the sole basis for 
entering the Wrongful Lien Injunction against Anderton and Prime Time—there was an 
alternate basis. Specifically, the trial court found that the First Lis Pendens was also a 
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wrongful lien that would support the Wrongful Lien Injunction. [R. at 969, pg. 55.] Thus, 
the Wrongful Lien Injunction would have been entered even if the trial court had found 
that the Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien. As such, the trial court's finding was 
not prejudicial and therefore does not constitute reversible error. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE SUBSEQUENT 
PURCHASERS WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. 
Anderton and Prime Time next challenge the trial court's finding that the 
subsequent purchasers of the Property were bona fide purchasers. It is important to put 
this issue in context. Specifically, the trial court made the determination that the 
subsequent purchasers were "bona fide purchasers" in denying the motion filed by 
Anderton and Prime Time for a preliminary injunction. [R. at 366, 969, pg. 56.] 
A. Anderton and Prime Time, Not Sage, Had the Burden of Proof on This 
Issue Before the Court Below, and Failed to Meet I t 
Given that Anderton and Prime were the parties seeking the preliminary 
injunction, the burden was on them below to show that a preliminary injunction was 
warranted. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e) (requiring applicant to show grounds for issuance 
of preliminary injunction). In an attempt to show, under Rule 65A(e)(3) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that a preliminary injunction would not be adverse to public 
interest, Anderton aind Prime Time made various unsupported allegations that there was 
some sort of "collusion" between the subsequent purchasers and Sage. [R. at 969, pgs. 
19-20.] 
20 
The trial court's finding that the subsequent purchasers were "bona fide 
purchasers" was really nothing more than a finding that Anderton and Prime Time had 
not met their burden of showing any "collusion" that would support the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction on public policy grounds: 
THE COURT: As to the weighing of the - as to the public policy, there 
appears to be a - in spite of an allegation of possible collusion, there is no 
evidence before me that there was collusion, that the new tenants are in fact 
straw men in this endeavor, that there was some way to collude between 
Sage - between plaintiff and the new buyers. These are, as far as I'm 
concerned, bona fide purchasers at this stage of the proceedings; they 
should not be prejudiced by the matter, and the Court finds for petitioner on 
that aspect. 
[R. at 969, pg. 56.] Indeed, it appears that the trial court used the term "bona fide 
purchasers/' not in the legal sense, but rather only to indicate a finding that there was no 
collusion. 
This finding was not clearly erroneous. It is clear from the record below that 
Anderton and Prime Time did not produce any evidence of collusion, despite their vague 
allegations. [R. at 99-108; 969, pgs. 19-20.] Contrary to Anderton and Prime Time's 
argument, as raised in their brief (see Appellant Brief, at 48), the burden never shifted to 
Sage to prove that there was no collusion or that the subsequent purchasers were "bona 
fide purchasers." Without any evidence to the contrary, the trial court correctly found that 
the subsequent purchasers were bona fide purchasers. 
B. Any Error Was Harmless Error. 
Even if the trial court did commit error in making its finding—and specifically, in 
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using the term "bona fide purchasers"—such error was harmless and therefore, it is not 
grounds for reversal. As noted above, "[o]n appeal, the appellant has the burden of 
demonstrating an error was prejudicial—that there is a reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ^ f 21 
(quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp.. 820 P.2d 482,489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
Where an error is harmless, an appellate court does not reverse the judgment of the trial 
court. Hall v. NACM Intermountaim Inc.. 1999 UT 97, f 21. 
Ultimately, the issue to be resolved by the trial court was whether public policy 
would favor or disfavor the issuance of a preliminary injunction. A determination of 
whether or not the subsequent purchasers of the Property were "bona fide purchasers" in 
the legal sense was not necessary before the ultimate issue could be resolved. The trial 
court could have made no finding regarding the subsequent purchasers of the Property 
and nevertheless still denied Anderton and Prime Time's request for a preliminary 
injunction. It should be noted that Anderton and Prime Time have not appealed the trial 
court's ultimate denial of their request for a preliminary injunction. As such, any error in 
the trial court's use of the term "bona fide purchaser" is harmless and does not warrant 
reversal. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE FIRST LIS 
PENDENS CONSTITUTED A "WRONGFUL LIEN" UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-9A-102 (2005). 
The trial court determined that the First Lis Pendens was a "wrongful lien" based 
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on its finding that it did not correspond with any properly filed complaint. [R. at 969, pg. 
55; 365-66.] Anderton and Prime Time now claim on appeal that the First Lis Pendens 
was not wrongful because it gave notice of Sage's petition and of their counterclaim. 
(See Appellant Brief, at 33-34.) They also claim that removal of the First Lis Pendens 
was improper because Sage's petition did not identify the First Lis Pendens. (See 
Appellant Brief, at 34-35.) 
A. Anderton and Prime Time Did Not Raise These Arguments Below and 
May Not Argue Them Now on Appeal. 
As noted above, arguments not raised before the trial court are usually deemed 
waived and cannot be argued on appeal. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 
847 (Utah 1998). Anderton and Prime Time claim that they preserved their argument that 
the First Lis Pendens did not constitute a wrongful lien and that removal was improper 
(see Appellant Brief, at 1), but a review of the record where indicated in their brief does 
not disclose any such arguments. [R. at 102-104; 969, pgs. 6-20, 52, 54.] Instead, the 
record discloses that their pleadings and oral arguments requested permission to file a 
new lis pendens and did not argue that the First Lis Pendens (recorded on July 14, 2006) 
was correctly recorded. To the extent that Anderton and Prime Time did not preserve 
these arguments below, this Court should not entertain them on appeal. 
B. The First Lis Pendens Was Correctly Found to Be a Wrongful Lien 
and Was Properly Removed, 
Even if this Court determines that Anderton and Prime Time's arguments were 
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preserved for appeal, it should nevertheless find that the First Lis Pendens was correctly 
found to be a wrongful lien and was properly removed. "[Ujnder Utah law a lis pendens 
cannot be filed when there does not then exist a pending action affecting title to or 
possession of the property." Winters v. Schulman. 1999 UT App 119, % 23, 977 P.2d 
1218. This Court has previously held that such an improper lis pendens is a "wrongful 
lien" within the meaning of the wrongful lien statutes. Id2 
At the time the First Lis Pendens was recorded, on July 14, 2006, Sage had filed its 
wrongful lien petition, but Anderton and Prime Time had not yet filed their counterclaim, 
which was not filed until August 2,2006. [R. at 87-95.] Thus, the First Lis Pendens 
could not have been recorded to give notice of the counterclaim, as claimed in the 
Appellants' brief. (See Appellant Brief, at 33-34.) 
Moreover, the petition filed by Sage for a Wrongful Lien Injunction was not a 
"pending action affecting title to or possession of5 real property. It was merely a petition 
for the removal of the Notice of Interest recorded against the Property by Anderton and 
Prime Time. [R. at 47-69.] Sage's petition did not purport to affect title and possession 
to the Property, which were already in Sage. 
2The Winters case was decided under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 ("Chapter 9"), 
entitled "Wrongful Liens and Wrongful Judgment Liens," the chapter preceding § 38-9a-
101 to -205 ("Chapter 9a"), applicable here. However, Chapter 9a incorporates the 
definition of "wrongful lien" as contained in Chapter 9, so it is clear that whatever is a 
"wrongful lien" under Chapter 9 is also a "wrongful lien" under Chapter 9a. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-9a-102 (2005). 
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Furthermore, it is clear that if a wrongful lien petition under Utah Code Ann. § 38-
9a-201 were to be construed to give the respondent the right to record a lis pendens 
against the subject property, the statute's purpose would be eviscerated. Victims of 
wrongful liens would not utilize the statute for fear that their petition under the statute 
would allow the wrongful lien recorder to tie up real property legitimately by recording a 
lis pendens. This cannot be what the legislature intended. 
The second argument raised by Anderton and Prime Time—that the trial court 
could not remove the First Lis Pendens because it was not identified in Sage's 
petition—is without merit. The reason the First Lis Pendens was not identified in the 
petition is because it was not recorded until several weeks after the petition was filed. In 
fact, Sage did not learn of it until shortly before its counsel delivered the ex parte order to 
the trial court to be signed. At that time, counsel for Sage orally modified the ex parte 
petition to include the recently filed lis pendens. [R. at 969, pg. 32-33.] The Wrongful 
Lien Injunction Act certainly does not prohibit a trial court from granting additional relief 
as it finds necessary. And in any event, the fact that the trial court removed the First Lis 
Pendens in addition to the Notice of Interest, despite the fact that it was not included in 
the petition, was not prejudicial to Anderton and Prime Time because the procedure was 
ex parte and Anderton and Prime Time were not on notice of the contents of the petition 
anyway. 
Thus, the trial court correctly nullified the First Lis Pendens on the basis that it was 
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a wrongful lien and entered a Wrongful Lien Injunction against Anderton and Prime 
Time. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE SECOND LIS 
PENDENS CONSTITUTED A "WRONGFUL LIEN" UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN, § 38-9A-102 (2005). 
Anderton and Prime Time concede that they failed to preserve for review any 
objections to the trial court's finding that the Second Lis Penden constituted a wrongful 
lien. (See Appellate Brief, at 1-2.) They ask this Court to review the issue under the 
plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions to the preservation rule. (See id.) 
[T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from 
an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show 
the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). This exception for review excuses a 
party from objecting when the error to which he should have objected was so plain and 
obvious that the trial court should have been aware of it. 
The exceptional circumstances exception applies only when the appellate court's 
failure "to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would... result[ ] 
in manifest injustice." State v. Alfatlawi. 2006 UT App 511, f 13, 153 P.3d 804 (internal 
quotation omitted, alteration in original). Indeed, the exceptional circumstances 
exception "is a concept that is used sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional 
situations, for cases ... involving rare procedural anomalies." IcL at f 44 (internal citation 
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and quotation omitted). 
A, Justification Does Not Exist for Appellate Review of This Issue, 
This Court should not review the trial court's finding that the Second Lis Pendens 
constituted a wrongful lien because there is no justification for review. First, Anderton 
and Prime Time's allegations of "plain error" are not directed against the issue from 
which they appeal. Second, Anderton and Prime Time have not estabUshed the elements 
necessary to show plain error. And third, there are no exceptional circumstances that 
would allow appellate review of this issue. 
1. Anderton and Prime Time's allegations of "plain error" are not 
directed against the issue from which they appeal. 
The first problem is that the error claimed by Anderton and Prime Time on 
appeal—the trial court's finding that the Second Lis Pendens constituted a wrongful 
lien—is not what they claim was "plain error." The "plain error," they allege, was the 
trial court's decision to waive the 20-day waiting period set forth in Rule 74(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Appellant Brief, at 37-42.) Because they do not 
allege any plain error in the trial court's finding that the Second Lis Pendens was a 
wrongful lien—which is the issue they admittedly failed to preserve below—that issue is 
not reviewable. Sea Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208 (holding that establishing "plain error" can 
allow an appellant to obtain appellate relief from that error when it was not properly 
objected to or otherwise preserved). 
Sage is unaware of any cases in which a Utah appellate court has held that 
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establishing "plain error" on one issue can allow an appellant to obtain appellate relief 
from a different alleged error that was not properly preserved. Indeed, that construction 
of the plain error doctrine would not make sense, given the rationale behind the doctrine. 
Thus, even assuming arguendo that it was plain error for the trial court to waive the 20-
day waiting period set forth in Rule 74(c), such a finding would not allow this Court to 
then undertake review of the trial court's finding that the Second Lis Pendens constituted 
a wrongful lien. 
2. Anderton and Prime Time have not established the elements 
necessary to show plain error. 
In any event, Anderton and Prime Time have failed to establish the elements 
necessary to show plain error. 
i. There was no error. 
First, it was not error for the trial court to waive the 20-day waiting period set forth 
in Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 74(c) provides in relevant part 
that, upon the withdrawal of counsel, "[n]o further proceedings shall be held in the case 
until 20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the 
unrepresented party waives the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the 
court." Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c) (emphasis added). 
The case cited by Anderton and Prime Time in their brief, Loporto v. Hoegemann. 
1999 UT App 175, 982 P.2d 586, was decided under a rule that was repealed effective 
November 1, 2003—Rule 4-506 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Critically, 
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Rule 4-506 was completely binding on courts as well as attorneys. See 14. at f^ 9 ("Rule 4-
506 unambiguously restricts both opposing counsel and the trial court.").3 In contrast, 
Rule 74(c) provides two exceptions for the 20-day waiting period—(i) if the 
unrepresented party waives the waiting period; or (ii) if the court orders otherwise. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 74(c). 
The record establishes that the trial court in this case ordered otherwise at the 
August 18, 2006 hearing, at which Mr. Anderton was present: 
MR. MORRIS: I just want to make sure we're clear, on the record, that 
Rule 74,20-day waiting period, is waived by the Court. You're permitted 
to do that under Rule 74b [sic]. This relates to appearing or appointing new 
counsel. 
THE COURT: Of course. 
[R. at 970, pg. 27.] The trial court was permitted to waive Rule 74(c)'s requirements 
under the plain language of the rule, and therefore there was no error. 
Moreover, it is apparent from the record that Anderton and Prime Time had notice 
of the August 16,2006 hearing on their counsel's motion to withdraw and Sage's motion 
3Rule 4-506, repealed effective November 1, 2003, provided in relevant part: 
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from the 
case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify, in 
writing, the unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to retain another 
attorney or appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further 
proceedings against the client. A copy of the written notice shall be filed 
with the court and no further proceedings shall be held in the matter until 20 
days have elapsed from the date of filing. 
LopprtQ, 1999 UT App 175, at \ 7. 
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to remove the Second Lis Pendens [R. 211-13], and failed to appear to present any 
objections that they might have to either motion [R. at 970, pg. 12]. Furthermore, the trial 
court held a hearing two days later, on August 18, 2006, "as an accommodation and 
convenience for Mr. Anderton, to advise Mr. Anderton of what had occurred" at the 
previous hearing [R. at 970, pg. 23] and to give him an opportunity to make any 
objections he deemed appropriate [R. at 970, pgs. 24-25]. Thus, any claim that the trial 
court erred by not allowing Anderton and Prime Time an opportunity to be heard after 
their counsel withdrew must fail. 
ii. Any error was not obvious. 
Second, even if the trial court did commit error, it was not obvious. "To show 
obviousness of the error, a defendant must show that the law was clear at the time of 
trial." State v. Beck 2006 UT App 177, % 9, 136 P.3d 1288 (internal quotation omitted). 
Even if this Court construes Rule 74(c) to not allow trial courts complete discretion to 
waive the rule's requirements, that is by no means clear from the plain language of the 
rule. On the contrary, it is clear that "in certain instances, trial courts have the inherent 
power to waive compliance with their own rules." Sperry v. Smith. 694 P.2d 581, 583 
(Utah 1984). Indeed, a trial judge has "broad discretion in determining how a [case] shall 
proceed in his or her courtroom/" Pratt v. Nelson, 2005 UT App 541, % 12,127 P.3d 
1256 (quoting University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n. 736 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987)). 
Because any error was not obvious, this Court should find that there was no "plain error" 
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that would permit review of the issue raised by Appellants. 
iii. Any error was not harmful. 
Anderton and Prime Time have not and cannot show that they were prejudiced by 
the trial court's waiver of the 20-day waiting period set forth in Rule 74(c). Their brief 
claims that had the trial court not allowed their counsel to withdraw at the same hearing in 
which it granted Sage's motion to remove the Second Lis Pendens, they "would have 
raised valid objections to the motion." (Appellant Brief, at 44.) Anderton and Prime 
Time were given notice of the August 16,2006 hearing and the respective motions that 
the trial court was to decide on that day—including the motion filed by their counsel to 
withdraw—but failed to appear. [R. 211-13; 970, pg. 12.] Anderton did appear at the 
August 18, 2006 hearing and was given the opportunity to make objections, but failed to 
do so. [R. at 970, pgs. 24-25.] Thus, any error made by the trial court did not prejudice 
Anderton and Prime Time, and therefore, there was no "plain error" that would allow this 
Court to review the issue that they failed to preserve below. 
3. No exceptional circumstances exist that would allow appellate 
review, 
Finally, Anderton and Prime Time have failed to address or analyze, as required, 
how there will be "manifest injustice" if their arguments are not reviewed on appeal. See 
Alfatlawij 2006 UT App 511, at ^  13. Therefore, this Court should also decline to review 
the issue raised under the exceptional circumstances exception to the preservation rule. 
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B. The Second Lis Pendens Constituted a "Wrongful Lien" Under Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-9a-102 (2005). 
Even if this Court determines that it will review the issue of whether the Second 
Lis Pendens constituted a wrongful lien, despite the fact that the issue was not preserved 
for appeal, it should nevertheless affirm the decision of the trial court. 
The trial court found that the Second Lis Pendens constituted a wrongful lien 
because it was filed without permission from the court in direct violation of the Wrongful 
Lien Injunction then in effect, which enjoined Anderton and Prime Time from "making, 
uttering, recording, or filing any further liens" on the Property "without specific 
permission from the court." [R. at 79-80; 167-69; 970, pgs. 16-17.] This finding 
embraces one of the statutory definitions of "wrongful lien." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
503.5(2)(b) (incorporated by reference into Chapter 9a by Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-102). 
In other words, in order to nullify the Second Lis Pendens on the grounds that it 
was a wrongful lien, the trial court had to determine whether it was (1) a lien, which was 
(2) recorded without specific permission from the court, (3) in violation of the Wrongful 
Lien Injunction. 
On appeal, Anderton and Prime Time now attempt to argue that the Second Lis 
Pendens was not a wrongful lien and should not have been removed. Specifically, they 
argue that (i) the Second Lis Pendens was not a "lien" (see Appellant Brief, at 19-23); (ii) 
the Second Lis Pendens was not an "encumbrance" (see Appellant Brief, at 29-31); (iii) 
the Second Lis Pendens was not recorded in violation of the Wrongful Lien Injunction 
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(see Appellant Brief, at 25-29). Their arguments fail. 
1. A lis pendens can be a "lien." 
An examination of the plain language of Chapter 9a, as well as Utah case law, 
makes it clear that a lis pendens can be a "lien." 
i. The plain language of Chapter 9a evidences the legislature's 
intent to include lis pendens in the definition of "wrongful 
liens." 
Chapter 9a (Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-101 et al.)? a relatively new statute, has an 
extremely broad scope and clearly applies to any document recorded on title to property, 
including a lis pendens, regardless of whether other statutory provisions may apply. 
Entitled "Wrongful Lien Injunctions," Chapter 9a borrows the definition of wrongful lien 
from its criminal counterpart, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5,4 which provides in relevant 
part: 
Wrongful liens and fraudulent handling of recordable writings—Penalties. 
(1) "Lien" means: 
(a) an instrument or document filed pursuant to Section 
70A-9a-516; 
(b) an instrument or document described in Subsection 
38-9-1(6); and 
(c) any instrument or document that creates or purports to 
create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in real or 
personal property or a claim on another's assets. 
4Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-102 states, "[a]s used in this chapter, 'wrongful lien' 
refers to a lien made in violation of section 76-6-503.5, and includes an instrument or 
document as defined in section 38-9-1." 
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Each of the subparts, (a)-(c), provides for an independent definition of the term 
"lien" that is subject to both criminal penalties and Chapter 9a. Subpart (a) applies to 
filings under the Uniform Commercial Code. Subpart (b) incorporates all liens made in 
violation of Chapter 9 (the other wrongful lien act). Subpart (c) provides a broad, 
independent definition of documents that are considered to be "liens." 
Subparts (b) and (c) are important in that they establish that a wrongful lien can 
include essentially any "instrument or document" that "creates or purports to create" a 
"lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in real or personal property or a claim on 
another's assets." Most importantly, subpart (c) does not provide for any exceptions, such 
as those found in Chapter 9. 
It is helpful to compare the two "wrongful lien" chapters under the Utah Code. 
The Wrongful Liens and Wrongful Judgment Liens chapter, "Chapter 9," and the 
Wrongful Lien Injunctions chapter, "Chapter 9a," provide co-existing remedies in dealing 
with "wrongful liens." Each, however, is a completely separate chapter and each utilizes a 
different definition of "wrongful lien." This case was brought under Chapter 9a, which 
has a much broader definition of "lien" and "wrongful lien" than Chapter 9. 
As previously noted, Chapter 9a incorporates the definition of "wrongful lien" 
from the Utah Criminal Code, § 76-6-503.5,5 rather than the much narrower definition 
5Section 76-6-503.5, as noted above, is defined in the Criminal Code as "(a) an 
instrument or document filed pursuant to Section 70A-9a-516; (b) an instrument or 
document described in Subsection 38-9-1(6); and (c) any instrument or document that 
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used in Chapter 9. The complete definition of "wrongful lien" in Chapter 96 is only one 
of three types of liens included in the definition of "wrongful lien" in Chapter 9a. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9a-102, 76-6-503.5(1). Thus, every wrongful lien under Chapter 9 
is a wrongful lien under Chapter 9a, but not the reverse. 
It is also telling that the legislature was specific in excluding appropriately filed lis 
pendens from the application of Chapter 9, the Wrongful Liens and Wrongful Judgment 
Liens chapter. Section 38-9-l(6)(a) specifically provides that liens "authorized by this 
chapter or another state or federal statute" are exempt from its definition. In addition, it 
specifically excludes appropriately filed Us pendens and mechanic's liens from its 
application in sections 38-9-2(2) & (3). The legislature is obviously aware of lis pendens 
and fully capable and willing to specifically exclude them from the definition of 
"wrongful lien" and "lien" if it is so inclined for a particular statute. 
Consistent with the legislature's apparent intent to include the broadest range of 
"liens" within the scope of Chapter 9a, it did not provide for any exceptions or exclusions 
for lis pendens or any other type of lien. Rather, it adopts the definition under the 
creates or purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in real or 
personal property or a claim on another's assets." 
6Section 38-9-1 defines a "wrongful hen" to mean "any document that purports to 
create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time 
it is recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document 
signed by the owner of the real property." 
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cnminal code, which is very broad and was apparently intended to include lis pendens. 
When deciding what the term "lien" means, one must take into account the 
context. Thus, when determining what "lien" means in a wrongful lien injunction, one 
must read the Wrongful Lien Injunction chapter. 
A careful reading of Chapters 9 and 9a reveals that Chapter 9a, the Wrongful Lien 
Injunction chapter, is designed to go significantly further than Chapter 9 in protecting 
people from continued harassment from others intent on recording wrongful liens. 
Moreover, it dovetails into section 76-6-503.5 of the Utah Criminal Code to significantly 
enhance the penalty for violating a wrongful lien injunction. 
One of the primary advantages of Chapter 9a over Chapter 9 is that if the Court 
determines based on a probable cause standard that a wrongful lien has been recorded, an 
immediate injunction is entered to prevent the filing of any further liens without 
permission from the Court. This injunction is important in that it prevents the filing of 
additional lawful or unlawful liens, without permission. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-
202(2) ("[T]he court may issue an . . . injunction that includes any of the following: (a) 
enjoining the respondent from . . . recording . . . any further liens without specific 
permission of the Court."). 
Essentially, the legislature has established a means of enforcing a "one chance" 
rule to record a legal and proper document on title without permission of the court. If an 
individual is found to have violated the rule, then he must get permission from the court 
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before recording anything further. This is an effective mechanism to prevent those who 
care nothing about civil damages and judgments, such as prisoners, people without assets, 
or people engaged in asset protection schemes, from continuing to record wrongful liens 
with effective impunity while causing tremendous delay and expense to the owners of real 
property. 
Section 38-9a-202(2) provides that if the court determines that a wrongful lien has 
been recorded or filed, it may "enjoin the respondent from making, uttering, recording, or 
filing any further liens without specific permission of the court." This use of "lien" must 
include all types of wrongful liens, including any encumbrance. Otherwise, Chapter 9a 
would provide broadly for the removal of liens, yet prevent a much narrower category of 
documents from being recorded by the injunction. A person could record an unlawful 
lien, thus triggering an injunction, and then could still record documents that do not fit 
within some external definition of "lien," causing all of the same problems that the 
injunction was designed to prevent. 
As used in a wrongful lien injunction, "lien" can have only one definition. Its 
definition must be co-equal with "wrongful lien" except that the lien need not be 
wrongful. Thus, it includes encumbrances and every other interest in property of any kind 
that in any way limits the owner's rights. This must be so given the wording, purpose, 
and function of the Wrongful Lien Injunction chapter. 
If one attempted to limit the scope of what "lien" means in the actual Wrongful 
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Lien Injunction, a person could record a subsequent "notice of interest" (assuming this 
document is not a "lien" under some independent definition) and not violate the 
injunction. As stated above, this argument must fail because it does not make any sense. 
Since a lien is simply one type of encumbrance, many types of encumbrances might not 
be "liens," as that term is defined outside of Chapter 9a. See Brewer v. Peatross. 595 
P.2d 866, 868 (Utah 1979) (stating that "it is appropriate to note that the term 
'encumbrance' is more comprehensive than 'lien' . . . there are some encumbrances upon 
property which are not liens."). It is inconceivable that the legislature intended the courts 
to be able to remove a broader class of liens than are protected by the subsequent 
injunction. 
In sum, the term "lien," as used in Wrongful Lien Injunction, means every filing of 
any kind that qualifies either as an encumbrance or lien. Moreover, this is obvious from 
the applicable statutes and the context of the entire proceeding. 
ii. Utah case law supports that lis pendens can be liens. 
Utah cases have held that lis pendens can be "wrongful liens" (and therefore, liens) 
under the definition contained in Chapter 9, which is incorporated under Chapter 9a. In 
In re Estate of Flake. 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589, the Utah Supreme Court treated a lis 
pendens as a lien and a wrongful lien for the purposes of both Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 
(wrongful liens and wrongful judgment liens chapter) and § 38-12-102 (notice of lien 
filings chapter). It refused to award damages under either statute because there had been 
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no required statutory demand to remove the lis pendens. Significantly, the Supreme 
Court did not question in any way its treatment of the lis pendens as a lien for the purpose 
of both statutes. 
In Winters v. Shulman. 1999 UT App 119, 977 P.2d 1218, the Utah Court of 
Appeals addressed a lis pendens that had been filed in Utah related to a divorce action in 
California. Id at f 3. The key fact was that the divorce action in California had been 
resolved by a final divorce decree before the filing of the lis pendens. IcL In analyzing 
whether the wrongful lien statutes (chapter 9) applied to the filing of the lis pendens, the 
Court of Appeals stated: 
At the time Winters filed his initial complaint section 38-9-1 provided that 
[a] person who claims an . . . encumbrance against, real property,... 
who knows or has reason to know that the document is . . . 
groundless,... is liable to the owner . . . for $1,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney 
fees, and costs . . . if he willfully refuses to release or correct such 
document of record within 20 days from the date of written request 
from the owner. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (1995) (repealed 1997). The statute's plain 
language clearly allows one whose property has been wrongfully 
encumbered to recover if such encumbrance is not removed within twenty 
days from the day the owner requests its removal. The statute makes no 
mention whatsoever that recovery is barred if the encumbrance has been 
removed, even if "replaced" by a non-wrongful encumbrance or, in this 
case, a restraining order. Because Winters may request relief under section 
38-9-1 for the alleged wrongful lien on his property, a request that, if 
granted, will affect both his and Schulman's legal rights, this claim is not moot. 
LL at 1f 11. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals held that a lis pendens can be a wrongful lien for the 
purpose of Chapter 9 when it fails to comply with the requirements for filing a lis 
pendens. Id It also held that a lis pendens is a wrongful lien pursuant to Chapter 9 if it is 
filed when no action is pending. Id at f^ 22. It further held that upon the wrongful filing 
of a lis pendens, damages may and should be awarded pursuant to Chapter 9 (wrongful 
liens and wrongful judgment liens). IcL at ^ 23. 
Although the Winters case was decided under a previous version of Chapter 9, the 
key terms are identical to those in this case. The Winters case is particularly relevant to 
the present matter because the definition of wrongful lien in Chapter 9a (wrongful lien 
injunctions) includes, but is not limited to, the definition of wrongful liens in Chapter 9. 
The Winters case, therefore, established that a lis pendens satisfies the definition of 
wrongful lien under both Chapter 9 and Chapter 9a. 
2. A lis pendens is an encumbrance on real property, and is therefore a 
"lien" under the statutory definition. 
A lis pendens is also an "encumbrance" under the statutory definition of "lien" set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-503.5(l)(c). In defining an encumbrance and the 
relationship between an encumbrance and a lien, the Utah Supreme Court gives us very 
helpful guidance: 
In regard to the defendants' argument that there was no encumbrance on the 
property because the assessment ordinance had not become effective nor 
created as a lien by the statute, it is appropriate to note that the term 
"encumbrance" is more comprehensive than "hen." For instance, 
mortgages, tax liens, labor and materialmen's liens, are encumbrances, but 
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without expatiating thereon, there are some encumbrances upon property 
which are not liens. An encumbrance may be said to be any right that a 
third person holds in land which constitutes a burden or limitation 
upon the rights of the fee title holder. 
Brewer v. Peatross. 595 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) 
(holding that expected assessments from special improvement district where work had 
already been performed were an encumbrance on title even though they has not yet been 
assessed). 
Several other cases support the broad definition given to "encumbrances" in 
Brewer. See Holmes Dev.r LLC v. Cook. 2002 UT 38, f 44, 48 P.3d 895 (defining an 
encumbrance as any interest that "injuriously affects the value of the property or 
constitutes a burden or limitation on the rights of the fee title holder"); Howe v. Prof 1 
Manivest Inc.r 829 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a trust deed 
"purporting" to burden the rights of the fee title owner was an encumbrance "regardless 
of its legal effect5'); Bergstrom v. Moore. 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) (holding that 
easement is encumbrance under same definition above); Webb v. Interstate Land Corp.. 
920 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1996) (adding to the definition above to include "real estate 
mortgages and other liens on real estate and all other rights in real estate that are not 
ownership interests"). 
A lis pendens creates an encumbrance on real property. The dramatic effect of a 
lis pendens is highlighted by the case of Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Company. 579 P.2d 
914 (Utah 1978). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court stated and held as follows: 
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The doctrine of lis pendens preserves the status quo by keeping the 
subject of the lawsuit within the power and control of the court until 
judgment or decree shall be entered. The recording of a lis pendens serves 
as a warning to all persons that any rights or interests they may acquire in 
the interim are subject to the judgment or decree. One who acquires an 
interest in hind that is the subject of pending litigation stands in no better 
position than the person he acquires it from, he is charged with notice of the 
claimed contrary rights of others, and he is bound by the judgment rendered 
in the litigation. 
In the instant case, the recording of the lis pendens on August 24, 1971, put 
United Paint on notice of the pending litigation as it affected the land in question. 
Consequently, whatever interest was conveyed by the deed of October 5, 1971, 
from Utah Valley to United Paint was clearly subject to the final judgment. 
The final undisputed fact is that the default judgment entered against 
Utah Valley (thereby quieting title in Bagnalls as against it) was previously 
affirmed on appeal to this Court. This event, coupled with the fact that a lis 
pendens was recorded, serves to conclusively defeat any interest United 
Paint may have acquired through Utah Valley. This is the case by reason of 
the doctrine of lis pendens which requires United Paint to stand in the same 
position of its grantor, Utah Valley. Consequently, when the interests of 
Utah Valley in the 140.15 acres were defeated, so were those of United Paint. 
IcL at 916-17. The Bagnall decision establishes conclusively the dramatic effect of a lis 
pendens in Utah. Given this legal effect, purchasers, transferees, and lenders are 
obviously driven away by an existing lis pendens. 
Other courts describe a similar practical effect. Since no prospective purchaser or 
lender will "buy a pig in a poke" by acquiring an interest that will be subordinated to the 
rights arising from the undetermined outcome of the pending litigation, the practical 
effect of a recorded lis pendens is to render land unmarketable and unsuitable as security 
for a loan. Beefy King IntT v. Veigle. 464 F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Or. 1972) ("For all 
practical purposes, it would be virtually impossible to sell or mortgage the property 
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because the interest of a purchaser or mortgagee would be subject to the eventual 
outcome of the lawsuit.")- As summarized by the Hawaii Supreme Court: 
[I]t is widely recognized that a recorded lis pendens can have a substantial 
adverse impact on the grantee's use of or benefit in the land. It has been 
noted that the practical effect of a recorded lis pendens is to render a 
defendant's property unmarketable and unusable as security for a loan. The 
financial pressure exerted on the property owner may be considerable, 
forcing him to settle not due to the merits of the suit but to rid himself of the 
cloud upon his title. 
S. Utsunomiya Enterprises, Inc. v. Moomuku Country Club. 866 P.2d 951, 963 (Haw. 
1994). 
The effect of a recorded lis pendens, therefore, is to place an "encumbrance" upon 
the land against which it is recorded under both Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a) and Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5(c). Since a lis pendens is an encumbrance under each of these 
statutes, it is also an encumbrance for the purpose of Chapter 9a, and therefore qualifies 
as a "lien." 
3. The Second Lis Pendens was filed in violation of the Wrongful Lien 
Injunction. 
The trial court correctly determined that the Second Lis Pendens was recorded 
without specific permission from the court in violation of the Wrongful Lien Injunction. 
In their brief, Anderton and Prime argue that the the Second Lis Pendens was not filed in 
violation of the Wrongful Lien Injunction because the Wrongful Lien Injunction entered 
at the August 11,2006 hearing was not on the authorized form and because it had not 
been personally served on Anderton or Prime Time. (See Appellant Brief, at 25-29.] 
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A review of the procedural time line is necessary here to demonstrate that these 
arguments lack merit. Sage filed its Petition for Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction and 
Request for Ex Parte Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction on June 28, 2006. [R. at 1-45.] At 
Sage's request, the trial court entered the Wrongful Lien Injunction on July 17, 2006, 
which enjoined Anderton and Prime Time from "making, uttering, recording, or filing any 
further liens without specific permission of the court/' [R. at 79-80.] Anderton was 
served with the Wrongful Lien Injunction on July 31, 2006. [R. at 83.] The Wrongful 
Lien Injunction contained the following language in bold, 15-point font: "This injunction 
will be presumed valid unless and until superseded by a subsequent order." [R. at 79-80.] 
Anderton and Prime Time requested a hearing to contest the injunction, and the 
hearing was held on Friday, August 11, 2006. Anderton was present at that hearing. [R. 
at 664.] At that tinie, the trial court, from the bench, rejected Anderton and Prime Time's 
opposition to the injunction. [R. at 55-59.] Not having been revoked, dissolved, or 
otherwise modified at the August 11, 2006 hearing, the Wrongful Lien Injunction 
continued in full force and effect pursuant to its own terms. On Monday, August 14, 
2006, the trial court signed the "Order Dissolving Temporary Restraining [Order] and 
Establishing Permanent Civil Wrongful Lien Injunction." [R. at 167-69.] After the trial 
court's bench ruling, but before the Order was signed, Anderton recorded the Second Lis 
Pendens. 
Chapter 9a provides in relevant part: 
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(3) A certified copy of an ex parte civil wrongful lien injunction or civil 
wrongful lien injunction is presumed to be a valid existing order of the 
court for a period of three years from the date of service of the ex parte civil 
wrongful lien injunction on the respondent. 
(4) (a) Any changes or modifications of the ex parte civil wrongful lien 
injunction are effective upon service on the respondent. The original ex 
parte civil wrongful lien injunction continues in effect until service of the 
changed or modified civil wrongful lien injunction on the respondent. 
(5) The ex parte civil wrongful lien injunction or civil wrongful lien 
injunction may be dissolved at any time upon written application by the 
petitioner to the issuing court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-204(3)-(5) (emphasis added). 
There is no provision in Chapter 9a that discontinues an ex parte injunction post-
hearing or requires that a new injunction be served on the respondents when no 
modifications have been made. Furthermore, it is clear that the original Wrongful Lien 
Injunction, entered on July 17, 2006, was on the authorized form [R. at 79-80] and that it 
was served on Anderton [R. at 83]. The trial court's decision to continue the original 
Wrongful Lien Injunction did not require that a "permanent" injunction be put on an 
authorized form and served on Anderton and Prime Time in order for them to comply 
with it, because the original Wrongful Lien Injunction was still in effect, based on its 
plain language and the statutory construction of Chapter 9a. 
Therefore, the trial court correctly found that the Second Lis Pendens was a 
wrongful lien and that removal was appropriate. 
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V, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT LIS PENDENS MAY BE 
REMOVED PURSUANT TO THE WRONGFUL LIEN INJUNCTION ACT, 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 38-9A-101 TO -205 (2005). 
The legislature adopted the specific lis pendens removal statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-40-2.5, in 2004, and the wrongful lien injunction statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9a-
101 to -205 ("Chapter 9a"), in 2005. Anderton and Prime Time argue that because there 
are two statutes, each must be an exclusive remedy for a specific type of document, and 
specifically, that a lis pendens should only be removed under the lis pendens removal 
statute to avoid "potential confusion." (See Appellant Brief, at 35-37.) There are 
several problems with this argument. 
First, if the legislature really had intended the lis pendens removal statute to be the 
only way to remove a lis pendens, it could have clearly excluded a lis pendens from the 
definition of "lien" contained in Chapter 9a. The legislature knows how to do this. In 
fact, as noted above in Part IV.B.l.i, Chapter 9, for example, does exclude lis pendens 
from its purview, see Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(2), but Chapter 9a does not. 
Second, there are benefits to having more than one remedy to remove a Us pendens 
that is wrongly recorded. It allows victims of wrongful lis pendens flexibility with their 
legal strategies depending on their circumstances. Under Chapter 9a, a victim has the 
benefit of being able to get a wrongful lis pendens removed right away on an ex parte 
basis. However, the victim also has the burden of showing that the lis pendens was 
wrongful if a hearing is requested. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-9a-203. In contrast, under 
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the lis pendens removal statute, a victim must file a motion and give notice under normal 
motion practice guidelines. A hearing must be held before the lis pendens can be 
removed. However, at the hearing, the recorder of the lis pendens, not the victim, has the 
burden of showing that the lis pendens is not wrongful. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-
2.5(3)(b). 
Anderton and Prime Time have demonstrated no legitimate reason why there 
cannot be two statutory remedies that can accomplish the same thing. This Court would 
have to ignore the plain language of the statute in order to find that the legislature 
intended for there to be only one remedy for removing a wrongful lis pendens. As such, 
this Court should find that the trial court correctly held that a lis pendens may be removed 
pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Injunction Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Many of the arguments that Anderton and Prime Time have raised on appeal may 
be summarily dismissed by this Court because they were not preserved below and because 
appellate review is not justified. Other points of error, at best, constitute harmless error 
that does not warrant reversal. This Court should affirm the trial court's rulings on any 
issues properly before it. 
The Notice of Interest, the First Lis Pendens, and the Second Lis Pendens that 
Anderton and Prime Time recorded in succession against Sage's Property were all 
wrongful liens that tied up the Property and prevented Sage from selling it. The recording 
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of the Notice of Interest, which was admittedly wrongful and later voluntarily released, 
forced Sage to file the petition for a wrongful lien injunction. Anderton and Prime Time 
then improperly recorded the First Lis Pendens against the Property. And then, despite 
the entry of the Wrongful Lien Injunction, Anderton and Prime Time recorded a third 
document on the Property—the Second Lis Pendens. Under Utah statutes and case law, 
as explained herein, all three documents were wrongful liens that were properly removed 
under the Wrongful Lien Injunction Act. This Court should affirm the trial court's 
rulings and award Sage its costs and attorneys' fees on appeal. 
DATED this H day of May, 2007. 
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